The Creationism/Evolution Debate: The Scientific Captivity Of Creationism by Weightman, Colin
State of the Art 
The Creationism/ Evolution Debate 
The Scientific Captivity Of Creationism 
Dr. Colin Weightman 
"Boom, hm, I have not troubled about the 
Great Wars," saidTreebeard; "they mostly 
concern Elves and Men. That is the business 
ofWizards: Wizards are always troubled 
about the future. I do not like worrying about 
the future. I am not altogether on anybody' s 
side, because nobody is altogether on my side 
if you understand me: nobody cares for the • 
woods as I care for them, not even Elves 
nowadays . ... And there are some things, of 
course, whose side I am altogether not on; I 
am against them altogether: ... these Orcs, 
and their masters." 
(J.JR. Tolkein, The Two Towers, part II of 
The Lord of the Rings, London: Unwin, 1974: 
65) 
:Despite its (generally) low public pro-
rue there is a vigorous campaign under-
way in Australia to polarise people into 
two groups - those who accept the reign-
ing biological paradigm we call 'evolu-
tion', and those who accept a religious 
position its advocates call 'creationism', 
'scientific creationism' or 'creation sci-
ence' 1. Following in the footsteps of a 
similar crusade in the United States it 
hopes to undennine the first group and in-
crease the popularity of the second. The 
key protagonists are the defenders of evo-
lution and these Christian fundamentalists 
who see the account of origins in the 
early chapters of Genesis as an historical 
scientific account of the process of crea-
tion. I feel restless in either camp (as they 
are c001monly defended) and am not, in 
Treebeard's words "altogether on any-
body's side". 
'Creationists' tie their exegesis of the 
biblical creation accounts to an outdated 
philosophy of science, and in their at-
tempt to counter these arguments 'evolu-
tionists' often retreat to an equally 
inadequate understanding of science2• 
In the Christian ccmmunity this contro-
versy often translates into a polarisation 
between groups calling themselves 'scien-
tific creationists' and 'theistic evolution-
ists'. Belief in 'creation' does not in any 
way imply acceptance of the rigid struc-
ture of 'creationism'. Of course this 
whole debate, whether within or without 
the church, can only take place inside a 
Christian frame of reference, and indeed 
as I shall explain, within a particular 
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Christian setting. In a Buddhist setting, 
for example, the debate would never arise 
since in Buddhism the world is in continu-
ous flux (including any 'gods') with any 
question of 'beginnings' totally unanswer-
able3. 
· I. The Creationism Evolution 
Debate in Australia 
While this debate has been imported 
from the United States it has taken finn 
root in Australia 4. Two Australian 
groups, the Creation Science Foundation 
(founded in 1980) and the Creation Re-
search Centre (founded in 1987), both 
based in Queensland and the second an 
offshoot of the first, have enthusiastically 
followed the line of their parent organisa-
tion, the Californian based Institute for 
Creation Research established in 1963 by 
Henry Morris. They speak to churches, 
school classes and other groups, attempt-
ing to convince people that a clear-cut 
choice must be made between the (atheis-
tic) theory of evolution and special crea-
tion in six literal days. If the audience is 
sympathetic they argue that evolution is a 
work of the Devil and the cause of all the 
evils of humanity5, and in less congenial 
surroundings they simply argue that the 
special creation model is better supported 
by the scientific facts than the evolution 
model. 
As in the United States they are at-
tempting to persuade educational authori-
ties that creationism should be given 
equal time to evolution in school biology 
courses. It seems that only in Queensland 
were they successful for a time when in 
1977 the National Party Minister for Edu-
cation stated that creationism should be 
taught alongside evolution in the public 
education system. Since then, however, 
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reference to creationism in the science syl-
labus was first attenuated and then 
dropped altogether6. Nevertheless the 
story is a continuing one with no apparent 
slackening of the creationist campaign. 
The Australian books: Creationism: An 
Australian Perspective ( 1986), published 
by the Australian Skeptics; Confronting 
Creationism: Defending Darwin (1987), 
the proceedings of the In Defence of Sci-
ence symposium sponsored by such 
groups as the Australian Institute of Biol-
ogy and the Royal Zoological Society of 
Australia; and The Creation Science Con-
troversy ( 1990) by the Catholic Education 
Adviser Barry Price, are all expressions 
of concern about the constant attempts of 
creationists to push for e~al time in 
school science syllabuses . They are 
proof of the contemporary nature of the 
controversy and the need for scholars to 
study this phenomenon carefully and not 
dismiss it as of no consequence. 
Broadly speaking and with reference 
to the creationism/evolution debate, Wil-
liam Phipps sets out two extreme views 
on the relationship of theology and sci-
ence. These are 'antitheological scien-
tism' at one pole and 'antiscientific 
ti. . ' th 8 crea omsm at e other A classical ex-
ample of the first position is that of the 
French philosopher Auguste Comte, 
though he died two years before Darwin 
published The Origin Of Species in 1859. 
For him science was the measure of all 
things and he dismissed speculation about 
divine things as superstition. Comte 
called his philosophy 'positivism', where 
the tenn 'positive' here has the sense of 
that which is given and has to be accepted 
as we find it without further explication9. 
In other words he argued that biblical the-
ology and natural science are mutually ex-
clusive, and that it is theology which must 
be rejected. Others following him would 
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apply this same reasoning to theology and 
evolution. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum is 
'antiscientific creationism' which affinns 
again the mutual exclusivity of theology 
and science but claims that it is science 
(and evolution in particular) not theology 
that is to be rejected. An expression of 
this approach is the comment by David 
Watson in his book on evolution: "if Sci-
ence is right, then the Bible is wrong: if 
the Bible is right then Science is 
wrong."10 
But many who seem to be advocating 
this approach have in reality a far more 
c<mplex approach to science, and this 
phenomenon is the key to this paper. 
Even Watson bolsters his argument by ref-
. h . . him11 erence to sctence w en 1t smts . 
This means that people such as David 
Watson and Henry Morris (who is per-
haps the best-known creationist apologist) 
are not 'antiscientific creationists' in the 
strict sense that Phipps defines the word. 
Their relationship to natural science is 
much more complex and ambiguous than 
that Morris also seems quite antiscience 
when he says: "there seems to be no possi-
ble way to avoid the conclusion that, if 
the Bible and Christianity are true at all, 
the geolof!cal ages must be rejected alto-
gether."1 Morris contrasts two models on 
origins: the 'Evolution Model' and the 
'Creation Model' and in his avocation of 
the 'Creation Model' argues that "the ba-
sic facts of science today fit the special 
creation model much better than they do 
the evolution model."13 He summarises 
the first model as: (1) naturalistic; (2) self-
contained; (3) non-purposive; (4) direc-
tional; (5) irreversible; (6) universal; and, 
(7) continuing; and the second as: (1) su-
pernaturalistic; (2) externally directed; _(3) 
purposive; and ( 4) completed. What this 
shows is that he cannot be described as 
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simply anti-scientific. He displays a com-
plex and inconsistent relationship to mod-
ern science which we will need to 
examine more closely. In this paper I will 
attempt to clarify the background and na-
ture of the creationist epistemology and 
argumentation. 
II. Creationist Interpretation of 
Genesis Chapters 13 
For creationists the question is, can we 
find a one-to-one relationship between the 
account of creation in the early chapters 
in Genesis and what science tells about 
the same event? This question they an-
. M . 14~ swer in the affinnattve. oms 10r ex-
ample sets out the following table for the 
six days of creation: 
One Energising of the physical elements 
of the cosmos. 
Two Formation of the atmosphere and 
hydrosphere. 
Three Formation of the lithosphere and 
biosphere. 
F ow Formation of the astrosphere. 
Five Formation of life on the atmosphere 
and hydrosphere. 
Six Formation of life for the lithosphere 
and biosphere. 
It is transparently clear that Genesis af-
finns God as Creator of the universe, but 
what such attempts lack is sensitivity to 
the kind of literature we are dealing with 
here. However even if we work within the 
framework of the creationist approach to 
Scripture the problems are insuperable. 
To demonstrate this I shall focus on Gene-
sis 2:6 reproducing part of the detailed 
discussion which Francis Andersen pre-
sents in his article on the first three chap-
ters ofGenesis15. The King James Bible 
translates this verse: "but there went up a 
mist from the earth and watered the 
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whole face of the ground". The Revised 
Standard Version does the same as the 
Kirig James but indicates in a footnote 
that the word translated 'mist' could also 
be translated 'flood'. The Jerusalem Bible 
takes the second alternative and trans-
lates: "however a flood was rising from 
the earth and watering all the surface of 
the soil." The verse in question says liter-
ally that "an I ed was coming up from the 
ground". What does ledreferto16? Ifwe 
don't know what it is, we can't use the 
verse to bolster any scientific theory of 
origins, or anything else. The word I ed oc-
curs only twice in the Hebrew Bible, in 
Genesis 2:6 and Job 36:27. In Genesis it 
is cormected with the ground, but in Job 
.the associations are with clouds and rain. 
What did the Israelites think this word 
meant? Unfortunately, points out An-
dersen, they never produced a dictionary 
of their own language and there is no suit-
able cognate'in any other Semitic lan-
guage. For this reason the early scholars 
were forced to guess. The Greek Septua-
gint translated it as 'spring' in Geresis 
and as 'cloud' in Job. In time the guess 
made for Job prevailed over the guess 
made for Genesis and the meaning 'mist' 
passed into gereral circulation for both 
verses and was 'canonised' by mediaeval 
Christian scholars. 
Taking the translation 'mist' as un-
problematic Henry Morris and John Whit-
comb developed a C(Jllplicated 
meteorological history of the earth be-
tween the 'mist' of cha.pter two and the 
'bow' of chapter nine1 . But all this falls 
to the ftJround if I ed doesn't mean 
'mist' ! In fact it seems that recent ar-
chaeological discoveries support the Sep-
tuagint translation as more likely after all. 
Hence the more recent translations use 
'flood' or 'groundwater'. In other words 
to decide this one way or the other we 
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need knowledge from outside the biblical 
text, and at the moment it is knowledge 
that we do not have. This means that the 
efforts of Morris and Whitcomb to prove 
that Geresis 2:6 is a scientific description 
of the process of evaporation from both 
land and water are completely misguided, 
even in the context of their own heiTile-
neutic. 
Attempts to demonstrate the scientific 
character of Genesis 13 go back a long 
way19. Andersen notes that the earliest 
known attempt is probably that in the 
pseudepigraphic book 2 Enoch. In this 
book the author read Geresis through the 
physics, astronomy and psychology of his 
day. Andersen writes that "the two un-
questionable things - the Bible and Sci-
ence - were shown to be one. "20 Thus the 
text was read in teiTils of the theories ac-
cepted by society at large. One question 
of great interest at this time was, 'What 
are people made of!'. Among the answers 
given there is wide agreement that people 
are made out of earth but with a special in-
gredient that makes them different from 
all other animals. 2 Enoch tells us that 
God created people out of seven compo-
nents: earth, dew, sea, store, clouds, grass 
and wind21. . 
This comes across as strange to us to-
day. It is hard to take it seriously. But it 
satisfied serious intellectual and spiritual 
needs by relating Genesis to the best sci-
ence that could be found at the time22. 
The reason they no longer appeal to us is 
that our science is so different from 
theirs. Relating the Bible to the science of 
the day will have quite different results in 
different ages. To emphasise the point An-
dersen23 adds that, 
/twas not until the work of Louis Pasteur that 
the proof of Genesis 1 :20 by the theory of 
spontaneous generation (up till then the uni-
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versa/ scientific belief) was given up. John 
Wesley (Sermon LVI) believed that Genesis 
1:1 meant "he first created the four elements, 
out of which the whole universe was com-
posed: earth, water, air, and fire, all mingled 
together in one common mass". There was a 
time when everybody believed that. Now no-
body does. In a hundred years the things that 
people are writing about Genesis 1-3 at the 
present time, which bring in nuclear fission or 
cosmic rays or whatever else happens to be 
current in twentieth-century science, will 
probably sound as ridiculous then as the con-
ception of elements in 2 Enoch now does to us. 
For these reasons alone all attempts to 
coordinate Genesis 1-3 with the science 
of the day are always do001ed to failure. 
m. Philosophy of Science and 
Biblical Interpretation 
However, not only has the text been ar-
tificially forced to match up with the cur-
rently acceptable science in creationist 
interpretations of Genesis but philosophy 
of science has had a petVasive influence 
on the fundamentalist biblical interpreta-
tion adopted by them. Despite this influ-
ence creationist expositors seem 
c001pletely unaware of the controlling 
epistemology standing behind their doc-
trine of creation. They do not seem aware 
that their interpretation of the Bible is 
often detennined by extra-biblical philoso-
phies. 
Some time ago it suddenly dawned on 
me that people who argued for creationist 
and fundamentalist positions were in fact 
being more rigorously scientific than oth-
ers less religious. The conclusions I was 
hearing were religious ones but the way 
in which they were presented was scien-
tific. It was not so much religious dis-
course but scientific discourse on a 
religious theme. My perception of this 
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was rather vague at the time, more felt 
than understood, but with the help of my 
reading since I have been able to crystal-
lise and give substance to this feeling. 
Books that have he1ped my understanding 
in this are The Authority and I nterpreta-
tion of the Bible (1979) by Jack Rogers 
and Donald McKim, and The Creationist 
Movement in Modern America (1991) by 
Raymond Eve and Francis Harrold, the 
most perceptive book yet published on 
creationism as a social phenomenon24. 
To understand creationist epistemol-
ogy and its relationship to philosophy of 
science we need to begin with the early 
writer on scientific method, the English 
philosopher-politician Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626). He set out a (now discred-
ited) methodology based on induction, 
which is a process of reasoning from ob-
setVations and ex~rimental results to 
some general law 5• There are many criti-
cisms of this approach and the arguments 
are well-rehearsed today. For example, 
how do we know what obsetVations to 
make or what experiments to construct26? 
This perspective was picked up and 
modified by the Scottish philosopher 
Thomas Reid (1710-1796). His was a 
'common sense' philosophy which ar-
gued that our senses are capable of giving 
us immediate contact with reality inde-
pendent of our minds27. The focus of 
Reid's Common Sense Realism was on 
obsetVable facts known to the senses. Fur-
thennore, following Bacon, he argued 
that "what can fairly deduced from facts, 
du1y obsetVed, or sufficiently attested, is 
genuine and pure. "28 
These perspectives became wide-
spread and dominant in the United States. 
As Mark Noll explains, the "Scottish vari-
ation of the new science provided such a 
satisfying explanation of reality for so 
many Americans that it was virtually the 
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sole scientific perspective in America dur-
ing the early nineteenth century."29 In-
deed Commonsense philosophy and 
Baoonianism inductivism became the eve-
ryday epistemology of ordinary people. It 
became the basis of what Michael 
Cavanaugh calls the 'empiricist folk epis-
temology' of American culture30 As Eve 
and Harrold point out "for most Ameri-
cans, (1) reality is perceived simply and 
directly through our senses, and (2) sci-
ence is the collection of proved facts."31 
Many factors reinforced this folk episte-
mology. Alice Kehoe reflects that "a phi-
losophy that made science and the search 
for knowledge not much different from 
engineering and that put it within the 
reach of any ordinary hardworking man 
was well suited to Americans. "32 
Thus it greatly influenced significant 
American evangelical scholars of the 
Princeton school like Archibald Alexan-
der (1772-1851), Charles Hodge (1797-
1878), Benjamin Warfield (1851-1921), 
and Gresham Machen (1881-1937)33. 
The approach of these men to Biblical in-
tetpretation has not been confined to 
America but is firmly entrenched in con-
setVative Christian circles worldwide, and 
it is this view that stands behind the inter-
pretation of Henry Morris and others like 
him of the first three chapters of Genesis. 
Let us see how this wotked out in the 
famous and influential three volume Sys-
tematic Theology of Charles Hodge34. 
Hodge explained in the beginning of this 
·work that knowledge in theology was ac-
quired just as knowledge in the natural 
sciences, by a process of induction from 
obsetVable facts. Rogers and McKim ex-
plain that "the manner in which Hodge in-
tetpreted the Bible arose from his Scottish 
common sense assumptions. Words in the 
Bible were treated like facts of nature. "35 
Furthermore Hodge asserted that the inte-
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gration of all knowledge could be accom-
plished on the basis of the Biblical data. 
At the beginning of his career he confi-
dently· appealed for support to the leading 
scientists of his day and because they 
were all doing things the same way he 
found his views confirmed. However, 
when a Darwinian evolutionary world 
view began to challenge his unrer-
standing of reality things changed36. 
Since words in the Bible were just like 
facts of nature in Hodge's mind he now 
began to refute scientific 'facts' with Bib-
lical 'facts'. He came to see the Bible as 
containing all the facts which could be 
discovered in nature. He was confirent 
that the Biblical data could be used to cor-
rect the findings of science. In conclu-
sion, his position was of 'theology as 
scientific induction' 37. 
To summarise then, these theologians 
were bound to an eighteenth-century Ba-
conian inductivism and Commonsense 
philosophy. They were unable to separate 
their exegesis of the Bible from the eight-
eenth-century theories that determined 
their intetpretation. DesP.ite their intention 
to give the Bible priority38, exegesis of 
the Bible was constrained by philosophi-
cal ideas which were imposed on it from 
outside39. People like Morris continue in 
this tradition, treating the words of the Bi-
ble like scientific facts not realising their 
own acquiescence to the philosophies of 
Francis Bacon and Thomas Reid. The fas-
cinating and significant point to note here 
is that their biblical exegesis and religious 
position flow out of a scientific perspec-
tive on the world40• 
Twentieth-century creationists are also 
unaware of the changing paradigms and 
philosophies of science which have gone 
through quite a few mutations since the 
time of Newton. And because of their sub-
jugation to an outdated philosophical posi-
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tion they are, as Bruce Vawter puts it, im-
pervious to the mapc and poetry of the 
biblical text itselt . Conrad Hyers 42 
writes concerning biblical literalism that it 
pays a· high price for the hope of having firm 
and unbreakable handles attached to reality. 
The result is to move in the opposite direction 
to religious symbolism, emptying symbols of 
their amplitude of meaning and power, reduc-
ing the cosmic dance to a calibrated discus-
sion. 
If we treat the Bible on the basis of 
philosophies foreign to the text then we 
will hinder the process of understanding 
it. With just this in mind Clark Pinnock 
calls upon fellow Christians not to allow 
"the modem demand for scientific infor-
mation to silence the agenda of God's 
Word"43. 
We have seen then that, paradoxically, 
this religious fundamentalist and seem-
ing! y anti -scientific approach to the ques-
tion of origins is supported by a scientific 
mindset. Certainly this mindset is uncriti-
cal and out of date but creationism is cap-
tive to the scientific ethos in ways that it 
is not itself aware. To this largely uncon-
scious influence must be added creation-
ism's conscious and detennmed effort to 
find support for the Creation Model in the 
'scientific facts'. In conclusion, my in-
itial perception of the scientific character 
of creationist fundamentalis~ has proved 
correct. 
This means that creationism is as 
much a scientific fundamentalism as a 
religious fundamentalism! It is insuffi-
cient to characterise it as preeminently a 
religious phenomenon and belief4". What 
we have seen is that the creationist episte-
mology and resulting biblical intetpreta-
tion are themselves undergirded by a 
Baconian philosophy of science. While 
their position rests on the authority of the 
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Bible and while they place it above the 
authority of science their adherence to an 
archaic philosophy of science means that 
their loyalties actually lie elsewhere! We 
have then 'the scientific captivity of crea-
tionism'. 
The tenn 'scientific fundamentalism' 
may seem strange to some but surely peo-
ple may construct their fundamentalisms 
from many varied 'noospheric' materials, 
including scientific ones. After I had 
coined this phrase I was interested to find 
that I was not the first to do so. The Fun-
damentalism Project directed by Martin 
Marty and supported by the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences called its 
fourteenth fundamentalism 'scientific 
Fundamentalism '45. Marty did not elabo-
rate on this in his 1989 Charles Strong 
Lecture but if fundamentalisms 'look 
backward' and 'freeze' some moment, 
event, text, philosophy or position as the 
'perfect place in time or space from 
which to measure '46 then people may do 
this just as well with philosophies of sci-
ence (as I am arguing here) or with eco-
nomic theories (economic 
fundamentalisms) or, more usually, with 
religious positions (religious fundamental-
isms). 
No doubt some of my readers will 
have noticed that my title has a certain 
structural similarity to the famous 1520 
treatise of Martin Luther 'The Babylonian 
Captivity of the Church'. In Luther's 
eyes, just as the Jews were carried away 
into captivity under the tyranny of the 
Babylonian Empire so in Europe the 
Christians were carried away from the 
biblical source of faith and made subject 
to the tyranny of the papacy through the 
misuse of the sacraments. One of the key 
issues for Luther was the imprisonment of 
the Christian scriptures by an extrinsic 
authority. I suggest that creationism, for 
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all its biblicism, finds itself in a similar 
position. It is not so much a religious 
fundamentalism in scientific guise but 
a scientific fundamentalism with relig-
ious goals. 
IV. Further Comme~ts on 
Philosophy of Science and 
Creationism · 
Two further comments need to be 
made to complete my analysis of the rela-
tionship of creationism and philosophy of 
science. The first is that though creation-
ists conceive of science in tenns of Ba-
conianism principles they fail to do 
Baconian science themselves47. Trey do 
not gather 'facts' in the field or labora-
tory, nor work to discern the patterns in 
~es~ ~acts. Nor have they published an~ 
Slgniftcant papers in scientific journals 8. 
For this reason Eve and Harrold charac-
terise creationism as an 'incomplete Ba-
co · . ,49 I . . . mantsm . ts sctenttfic character ts 
more exegetical than practical. Most of 
the time creationists criticise the writings 
of evolutionists from their Baconian per-
spective but fail to 'complete' their phi-
losophy with concrete research. 
The second comment is that not only 
has Baconianism become part of the intel-
lectual makeup of creationism but it has 
also made apologetic use of the falsifica-
tionism of Karl Poppe2° Creationists like 
Morris reply to the criticism that creation-
ism is not scientific with the counterclaim 
that evolution is not scientific either51. 
They do so under the banner of falsifica-
tion. Morris quotes from Popper's 1963 
address to the Federation of American So~ 
cieties for Experimental Biology where 
he raises the question as to what would 
constitute a possible refutation of the the-
ory of natural selection52. I have exam-
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ined this subject elsewhere 53, but it is sig-
nificant to note that Popper has stated in a 
letter to New Scientist that he had never 
intended to deny scientific character to 
the theory of evolution 54. 
Of greatest interest for us is that here ~tanding behind the creationist apologeti~ 
ts yet another philosophy of science, se-
lectively applied. We have seen the funda-
mental place of (an unexamined) 
Baconian inductivism in creationism; 
now we see the use of (an equally unex-
amined) Popperian falsificationism 55• 
Again the scientific character of creation-
ism is revealed, though in the case of falsi-
ficationism its use is more self-conscious 
and less central to their whole approach. 
V. The Mystery of Beginnings 
. One ~f the aphorisms of R.D. Laing is 
sun ply: If I don't know I don't know, I 
think I know. "56 It seems to me that in the 
debate between creationists and evolution-
ists both sides assume they know more 
than they really know. They don't know 
they don't know. I have indicated this 
with respectto the creationist critique of 
evolution, but the evolutionist counter-cri-
tique of creationism is not immune to this 
blindness either. There is an inbuilt arro-
gance in both positions. Too often scien-
tists have attempted to refute creationism 
with their own equally unexamined ver-
sions of Baconianism or falsificationism. 
It needs to be understood that 'evolu-
tion' is a changing theoretical complex. 
The foundation stones of Darwin's theory 
of origins, that is, natural selection and 
the accumulation of small, accidental, cu-
mulative changes (gradualism) are today 
under sie~ from within biological sci-
• ~"":..'i7 
ence 1tse1r . The mechanisms of the de-
velopment of life are not well understood 
and such explanations as: genetic change 
du~g embryonic development ( embry-
omc change), alterations in the chromo-
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somes leading to modifications of lire 
fonns (chromosomal speciation), ac-
quired characteristics passed on from par-
ents to offspring (neo-Lamarckian 
mechanisms), catastrophes in which 
whole life forms are destroyed (punctu-
ated equilibria), and sutvival not of the fit-
test (as Darwin thought) but of the 
luckiest, are recent attempts to fill the 
gap 58. Put together these suggest quite a 
different perspective than that of Dar-
. 59 
wm. 
It is also coming to be recognised that 
life must obey some organising or self-or-
ganising principles which favour certain 
fonns of life over others (the morphologi-
cal approach)60. Darwinism is a theory of 
stability which affirms the capacity of 
fonns to persist through genetic change 
but it doesn't say anything about the gen-
eration of form. Add to this the revolu-
tionary work of llya Prigogine on the 
thermodynamics of non-equilibrium sys-
tems, and the dynamic and unfinished 
state of theories on life's development is 
highlighted61. Prigogine's theories sug-
gest that order and organisation can actu-
ally arise 'spontaneously' out of disorder 
and chaos. These theories have forced a 
rethink of our traditional understanding of 
the laws of thermodynamics. Prigogine ar-
gues that under non-equilibrium condi-
tions entropy may produce rather than 
inhibit order. 
Francis Hitching62 in his book on the 
problems of Darwinian theory concludes 
that 
The new biology is looking afresh at living 
things- at their shapes, their patterns, their 
dynamics and their relationships. If after 
more than a century, natural selection has 
been tested andfoundwanting, and ifwe are 
left once again with a sense of ignorance 
about origins, Darwin would not have 
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minded. Science is a voyage of discovery, and 
beyond each horizon there is another. 
The more we know the more questions 
we throw up. "As our knowledge grows 
so does our ignorance" wrote Kenneth 
Boulding63. 
But not only do we need a 'sense of ig-
norance' about the evolution of the uni-
verse we need a 'sense of mystery'. What 
is missing from most evolutionist and 
creationist writings is the acknow-
ledgment that they do not have the 
whole story. In their self-righteous avoca-
tion of their respective positions they 
have assumed that they know more than 
they really know. Both sides have lost a 
sense of the mystery of matter and the 
mystery of its genesis. We need a sense 
of the infinity of what is beyond us, and 
the mystery and de.Qth of the things which 
we take for granted64• 
Modem science tends to eliminate 
mystery as a category. It does not expect 
to find pockets of myste~ which it will 
not be able to penetrate 6 . The whole con-
troversy over origins has been charac-
terised by a rationalistic and scientific 
mindset that has obscured as much as it 
has revealed. Combining proposals by 
Eric Mascall and Rudolf Otto I suggest 
that we need to acknowledge a genuine 
distinction between problems (which sci-
, ence may competently tackle), puzzles 
!,i (which analysis may clarify), and myster-
jr ies (which even when we understand 
if them to a degree, remain irreducibly mys-
terious)66. Despite the likelihood of com-
plex situations and the difficulty of 
demarcation I would argue that such a 
stance is more realistic than the carte 
blanche denial of any category of mystery. 
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